Blue and Gold Illustrated

next TD to go ahead 12-7 in the second quarter, Parseghian opted to "chase the points" and go for two to compensate for the flubbed point after try. A dozen years ago, we asked him why. He reflected on it before stating he felt that in a championship game that was expected to be tight, the team would need to try to get every possible point it could. It was more a judgment call, he admitted. The pass from quarterback Tom Cle- ments to receiver Pete Demmerle barely was completed over an Alabama de- fender in position to break up the play — but the 14-7 lead (instead of 13-7) would prove crucial in the 24-23 tri- umph. Had the play not worked and the Irish ended up losing by one … Par- seghian likely would have been ex- coriated. Such is the life of a head coach. Even if the play had not worked, the ebb and flow of the game might have changed. BENEFIT OF HINDSIGHT In 1978 at eventual national champ USC, head coach Dan Devine's Irish trailed 24-6 in the fourth quarter before Joe Montana and Co. put on a sizzling rally to go ahead 25-24 with 46 seconds left. After a TD pass cut had cut the Irish deficit to 24-12, Notre Dame opted to go for two and failed. When it scored again, it kicked the extra point to make it 24-19. And then the third TD, made the score 25-24 with less than a minute left and required that Notre Dame go for two so that a 27-24 lead would still result in a tie in case of a USC field goal. The two failed again, and then USC kicked the game-winning field goal to win 27-25. If Devine had continued to just kick extra points, the Irish would have, at worst, tied. However, let's say Notre Dame did kick the extra point to make it 24-13. When the Irish reduced the margin to 24-19 with 3:01 left, it would have had to go for two, because then at 24-21 it still had a chance to tie, whereas at 24-20 it wouldn't. And if ND had made the two at 24-21, then another TD and ex- tra point would have upped the score to 28-24 — with USC now needing a touchdown to win. Yet there is no way to know how the One Man's Opinion In my humble opinion, I would have opted to kick the extra point at Clemson to make it a 21‑10 deficit, but that's just my conservative nature. At 24‑10 then, you would still be "on schedule" with two touchdowns and two extra points for a 24‑24 tie, or still two scores away to tie it at 21‑21. If it becomes 28‑10, then it's a three‑score deficit whether it's 28‑10 or 28‑11. The crux is you don't go for two until it's a certainty that it's needed. When Georgia Tech was down 30‑7 in the final minute at Notre Dame Sept. 19, it scored a touchdown, and then kicked the extra point to make it 30‑14. That still left it within two scores. When the Yellow Jackets tallied again, they had to go for two and con‑ verted, to pull within 30‑22 and give itself one last chance. That was an example of not going for two until needed. But many of the all‑time greats went for two in such situations, so it was not necessarily a poor decision by Kelly, either. If it succeeds, he's praised for being aggressive and proactive. If it fails, he's labeled a dummy. Such is the life of any coach. — Lou Somogyi

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