Blue and Gold Illustrated

at 40-29, all Northwestern needed was field goal, a touchdown and a two- pointer instead of two touchdowns. That's what occurred, with the Wildcats tying the score before winning in over- time, 43-40. That was not a judgment call; it was the wrong decision. Then this Oct. 3 at Clemson, a Notre Dame touchdown with 14:13 left in the contest cut its deficit to 21-9. Kicking the point after to make it 21-10 is logical, thus leaving you a field goal, a TD and two-pointer away from potentially tying it at 21 and going into overtime. Kelly went for two, but the pass in wet conditions went through junior wide receiver Corey Robinson's hands, and at 21-9 the Irish were more behind the proverbial eight ball. Had the Irish just continued kicking three extra points, the score maybe would have been 24-24 to get into overtime instead of needing to go for two again and losing 24-22. When Kelly was asked about going for the two at 21-9, he did not second- guess himself. "You're obviously looking at the situa- tion after the fact," Kelly replied. "If you look at it after the fact, you can draw any conclusion that you would like … I didn't have any of the information that you have right now after the fact. All I had was we were down, and we got the chance to put that game into a two-score [situation] with a field goal." However, it still would have been a "two-score game" at 21-10 — and even at 24-10. "I don't chase the points until the fourth quarter, and our mathematical chart — which I have on the sideline with me — and we have a senior adviser who concurred with me, and we said go for two," Kelly said. "It says on our chart to go for two. "We usually don't use the chart until the fourth quarter because, again, we don't chase the points. We went for two to make it a 10-point game. "We felt we had the wind with us, so we would have to score a touchdown and a field goal — because we felt like we probably only had three more pos- sessions … and we're going to have to score in two out of the three. "It was the smart decision to make; it was the right one to make. If we catch the two-point conversion, which was wide open, then we just kick the extra point [later, assuming it is 24-24) and we've got a different outcome." HISTORY LESSONS When a two-point attempt doesn't work, in hindsight it can become the wrong choice. If the call is successful, it is hailed as "gutsy" strategy. Two of the great titans in football his- tory, Texas' Darrell Royal and Notre Dame's Ara Parseghian, won national titles while going for the two-pointer earlier than necessary. In December 1969 at Arkansas, No. 1 Texas trailed the No. 2 Razorbacks 14-0 in the fourth quarter. After a Longhorns TD made it 14-6, Royal opted for the two-pointer, reasoning that even if he missed, a TD and a two later would still lead to a tie. Texas made it (on a running play, no less) and went on to win, 15-14. In the 1973 Sugar Bowl showdown for the national title against Alabama, Notre Dame scored the first TD to lead 6-0, but a bad snap prevented the ex- tra point. When the Irish scored their

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